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Abstract 
This paper re-considers the much-lauded transformative potential of nostalgia, and proposes 
that an adequately psychological engagement with nostalgia is necessary if the critical 
capacities of this phenomenon are to be adequately assessed. In order to do this, the paper 
identifies parallels between the concept of nostalgia and a series of psychoanalytic concepts 
(the imaginary, fetishism, fantasy, affect, screen-memories and retroaction). Such a 
comparative analysis allows both for a critique of sociological notions of nostalgia and a 
series of speculations on how nostalgia as a defensive formation may aid rather than 
overcome types of structured forgetting. The use of psychoanalytic concepts enables us to 
grasp how nostalgia may operate: 1) in the economy of the ego, 2) in the mode of the fetish, 
3) in the service of fantasy, 4) as an affect concealing anxiety, 5) as screen-memory and, 6) as 
means of reifying past or present rather than attending to relations of causation obtaining 
between past, present and future. One should thus investigate each of these possible defensive 
functions within any given instance of nostalgia before proclaiming its transformative 
potential. 
 
Keywords: Reflective/restorative nostalgia, psychoanalysis, fetish, memory, ego, 
history. 
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Screened History: Nostalgia as Defensive Formation 
 
The Apartheid Archive Project (AAP) is premised on an attempt to retrieve discomforting 
historical memories of South Africa’s oppressive apartheid past 
(http://www.apartheidarchive.org/site/). In an earlier discussion of the difficulties inherent in 
such an objective, I noted that resistances to this task – subjective and in some many cases 
societal – seemed to know no bounds (Hook, 2011a). Of course, given the traumatic quality of 
such memories for many who suffered under apartheid, the anger and resentment thus 
occasioned, and of course the guilt and sense of complicity for those who number amongst 
apartheid’s beneficiaries, one can appreciate that such memories do not come easy. In the 
light of this challenge, and the AAP’s warning that what is not remembered of the apartheid 
pasts risks being repeated in the post-apartheid present, one might well take hope in any 
possible cultural aide memoire that might assist in this project of retrieval. The current 
blossoming of nostalgia within South African society – most markedly perhaps in literature 
and popular culture - may seem then to offer a critical vehicle of considerable interest (see 
Gevisser (2011) and Medalie (2010) for discussions of the outpouring of nostalgic apartheid-
era memoirs and (auto)biographies; see Truscott (2011) for an astute analysis of nostalgia and 
melancholic self-parody in South African rap music and music festivals). 
 Then again, despite the prevalence of nostalgia as a popular topic in post-apartheid 
South Africa – take for example the media interest attracted by the Narratives, nostalgia and 
nationhoods conference held in Johannesburg in July 2011- one needs ask whether nostalgia 
is, in effect, the ‘right problematic’. I note this not only due to the obvious political reasons – 
that the bittersweet enjoyment of memories of apartheid seems morally dubious - but due to 
concerns both clinical and intellectual. In embracing the topic of nostalgia are we unwittingly 
endorsing a style of memory that amounts to a defensive formation, an obstruction rather than 
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an asset to the project of retrieving recalcitrant (or indeed traumatic) memories? This is the 
crucial question around which my speculative comments in this paper turn. The issue of the 
types of memory to be prioritized as means of facilitating the working-through of historical 
trauma in post-apartheid South Africa is of importance to those interested in the resolution of 
ongoing socio-political conflicts, indeed, in the broad agendas of peace psychology. For if 
what divides communities is in part a function not only of history, but of partially recollected 
and/or differently recalled histories, then an exploration of different modalities of memory 
constitutes a clear socio-political imperative. Such projects of historical retrieval, of different 
types of remembering, hold out the promise of viewing the past anew, and consolidating a 
new order based on a joint commitment to confronting and ‘working-through’ a divisive 
history. 
 Several qualifications are in order here. Although my objectives here are critical, my 
concern is not simply to jettison the notion of nostalgia, but to open it up for further reflection 
from a distinctive psychoanalytic vantage-point. My aim is not to dismiss the critical potential 
of those retrievals of history that ostensibly ‘reflective’ types of nostalgia allow for. It is 
rather to expand upon certain of the possible underlying psychical operations occurring within 
nostalgia, and thereby to offer commentary on how the critical propensities of so-called 
reflective nostalgia might in fact be usefully augmented, or critiqued. Such an exercise will 
require both a careful attention to how nostalgia is being defined, and to the psychoanalytic 
concepts – those of the imaginary, fetishism, the affective, the screen-memory and retroaction 
– that I apply in my critique of this concept.  
To stress, from the outset: whilst much of nostalgia might be shown to possess a 
defensive function, we should nonetheless remain aware of its potentially destabilizing or 
‘unselfing’ potential, that is, nostalgia’s prospective ability to unseat prevailing norms and 
orthodoxies. Like the speech of the patient of psychoanalysis, nostalgia – we might venture – 
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may present in primarily defensive forms whilst nonetheless providing an instrument to 
access precisely what is being defended. Making this point ushers in the tricky issue of the 
distinction between ostensibly individual as opposed to predominantly societal forms of 
nostalgia. Of course, this is a distinction we may wish to complicate inasmuch as these two 
categories of reality are necessarily juxtaposed; they are inherently intermeshed, and thus 
ultimately indivisible.  
In what follows my focus will be predominantly on the latter, on socio-political 
nostalgia (nostalgia within the parameters of popular discourse), with the important caveat 
that such forms of nostalgia should themselves be seen as subject to the psychical processes 
that characterize nostalgia’s individualized forms. The broader question of the relation 
between the subjective and the socio-political in (post)apartheid contexts is one I have tackled 
at some length elsewhere (Hook, 2008). Suffice for now to say that a psychoanalytic 
perspective needs to appreciate the unique perspective of an individual’s own particular 
engagement with social reality (that is, with what is distinctively nostalgic to them), while 
emphasizing nevertheless that such engagements remain always mediated by – cut from the 
cloth of – socio-symbolic reality.  
 
In Defence of Nostalgia 
Cognisant of the wealth of literature on nostalgia (Davis, 1977, 1979; Kaplan, 1987; Kleiner, 
1977; Smith, 1998; Stauth & Turner, 1988; Tannock, 1995), I will limit my discussion by 
focussing largely on the distinctions between ostensibly progressive (i.e. potentially 
transformative) and regressive (or rehabilitative) types of nostalgia, and by highlighting 
material most pertinent to the post-apartheid context. Clearly, given the perspective I adopt 
here, I will also attend to those facets of nostalgia of particular pertinence to a psychoanalytic 
conceptualization. 
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 This prospect of nostalgia as critical instrument owes much to Boym’s (2001) 
landmark The Future of Nostalgia which poses the distinction between restorative and 
reflective types of nostalgia. Boym admits of her distinction that these two types “do not 
explain the nature of longing nor its psychological makeup and unconscious currents” (p. 41). 
It is precisely this missing psychical dimension that I wish to comment upon in what follows. 
Boym gathers a variety of perspectives on nostalgia that are worth sampling as a means of 
introducing the concept. “Nostalgia is a longing for a home that no longer exists or has never 
existed” (p. xiii). It is a sentiment moreover “of loss and displacement” (p. xiii), an “ache of 
temporal distance” (p. 44), but also “a romance with one’s own fantasy” (p. xiii). Although by 
no means limited to modernity, nostalgia “inevitably reappears as a defense mechanism in a 
time of accelerated rhythms of life and historical upheaval” (p. xiv). Boym does not deny that 
nostalgia possesses mechanisms of seduction and manipulation. For her nostalgia entails not 
just a rhythm of longing, but also “enticements and entrapments” (p.xvi). Importantly also, 
particular given our concerns with the post-apartheid context, “Outbreaks of nostalgia often 
follow revolutions” (p. xiv), or we might extrapolate, the advent of socio-political transition. 
Boym splits nostalgia as ‘longing for a return to home’ into two overlapping 
categories: one weighted towards the objective of such a return, the other more focussed on 
the vicissitudes of longing itself: 
 
Restorative nostalgia… attempts a transhistorical reconstruction of the lost home. 
Reflective nostalgia thrives in…the longing itself, and delays the 
homecoming…ironically, desperately. Restorative nostalgia does not think of 
itself as nostalgia, but rather as truth and tradition. Reflective nostalgia dwells on 
the ambivalences of human longing and belonging and does not shy away from 
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the contradictions of modernity. Restorative nostalgia protects the absolute truth, 
while reflective nostalgia calls it into doubt (p. xviii). 
“Reflective nostalgia” she continues “explores ways of inhabiting many places at once and 
imagining different time zones” (p. 41). It “cherishes shattered fragments of memory”, it 
values not so much the lost home as “the emotional resonance of distance” (p. 49). Ironic and 
inconclusive it remains “aware of the gap between identity and resemblance” (p. 49). 
Furthermore:  
At best reflective nostalgia can represent an ethical or creative challenge… This 
typology of nostalgia allows us to distinguish between national memory that is 
based on a single plot…and social memory, which consists of collective 
frameworks that mark but do not define the individual memory (p. xviii). 
Boym repeatedly makes restorative nostalgia about communal identity and national meta-
narratives; as such she grants it a hegemonic character. Reflective nostalgia is permitted the 
latitude of moving between collective and individual frames of reference. Whereas the former 
often seems blatantly ideological in its uses, the latter holds out a marked ethical potential. It 
is perhaps worth emphasizing the point – sometimes blurred in Boym’s discussion – that it is 
not nostalgia itself which is alternatively progressive or reactionary, but the uses to which it is 
put. 
An often neglected point regards Boym’s (2001) distinction is that these are not to be 
considered mutually-exclusive types, but rather trajectories, tendencies – that often overrun 
one another – of giving meaning and shape to nostalgia. While Boym does emphasize this 
fact, her rudimentary typology may be said to under-estimate the difficulties of extracting one 
type from the other. The possibility of such a permanent juxtaposition poses a degree of 
‘undecidability’, the prospect that is to say – a point not conceded by Boym - of ostensibly 
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regressive nostalgia nonetheless holding out progressive potential, and the related prospect of 
progressive nostalgia concealing a set of reactionary investments.  
Pickering and Keightley’s (2006) analysis of the concept of nostalgia makes the case 
for the critical rejuvenation of an idea they feel has typically been viewed as reactionary, 
sentimental, even melancholic. They respond to a tendency to view nostalgia as nothing more 
than a defeatist retreat from the present. There is of course some truth to the view that 
nostalgia is about the present rather than the past (Boym, 2001; Davis, 1979), occasioned as it 
is by current anxieties, discomforts or perceived losses, hence their gloss of nostalgia as “the 
composite feeling of loss, lack and longing” (p. 921). The backward glance of nostalgia is 
thus a means of mediating the present and the prospective future. Nonetheless, Pickering and 
Keightley (2006) argue that nostalgia occurs within multiple registers; it has numerous 
manifestations, its meaning and significance are diverse; it “should be seen as accommodating 
progressive, even utopian impulses as well as regressive stances” (p. 919). Their hope is that 
we might be able to distinguish between the desire to return to an earlier state or idealized 
past, and the desire not to return “but recognize aspects of the past as the basis for renewal 
and satisfaction in the future” (p. 921). Nostalgia might function then as a compass, a means 
of direction amidst the uncertainties and predicaments of the present and future: 
This opens up a positive dimension in nostalgia, one associated with desire for 
engagement with difference, with aspiration and critique…There are cases where 
past-fixated melancholic reactions to the present prevail, and other where utopian 
longings drift free of any actual ontological basis in the present (p. 921). 
Pickering and Keightley (2006) stress repeatedly the mutually constitutive interrelations of 
both such dimensions of nostalgia; it is by virtue of this relation “that the potential for 
sociological critique arises” (p. 921). Such an emphasis on the complexity of nostalgia and the 
simultaneity of its regressive and progressive movements is to be welcomed; it warns against 
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any naïve idealization of the phenomenon, and signals the political ambiguity of nostalgic 
reminiscence.  
 
Apartheid Nostalgia 
David Medalie’s discussion of the uses of nostalgia in post-apartheid fiction adds to the above 
differentiation. What he refers to as ‘evolved’ nostalgia “recognizes the extent to which the 
present invests in narratives of the past [along with]…the constructedness of memory” (p. 
40). Such a nostalgia draws attention to the partiality of what is recalled; it makes 
connections, revises memories and construes a growing set of links between past and present. 
This is an ‘intricate nostalgia’ that opens up the possibility of “reinvention and the fashioning 
of new, rather than received, meanings” (p. 42). By contrast, unreflecting forms of nostalgia 
fail to subject the past to adequate interrogation. The past here is fixed, sealed off “in its 
unique remoteness”; it becomes thus a static utopia, irretrievably lost, cut off from any 
meaningful relations with the present. 
Of particular interest here is not only Medalie’s critique of a given mode of nostalgia - 
“glib, unambitious and utterly lacking in self-consciousness” (p. 37) - but his indication of 
how certain formal features might be read as an index of the failure of creative uses of the 
nostalgic impulse. What is in question is how formal devices - the language and narrative 
impetus of novels in question, the flatness of characters etc. - prove unable to “distance 
themselves…from the nostalgia” and thus to “provide a persuasive critical scrutiny”. This 
intriguing suggestion of a link between artifices of form and a regressive mode of nostalgia 
will be important in what follows.  
A further note of interest in Medalie’s analysis of literary nostalgia for apartheid 
concerns the disingenuous quality evident in some of the material: 
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Ostensibly [such novels]…disown the very nostalgia which they have sketched so 
vividly because they feel it is incumbent upon them to do so; but the narrative 
energy is focused to such an extent upon those elements that constitute the 
nostalgia that it leaves one in no doubt as to the force of its embrace (p. 37). 
This is an astute observation that warns us that even in its most critical moments, the 
‘libidinal ambience’ of such animated memories nonetheless enchant us, hold us in their 
thrall. We might frame this idea psychoanalytically: the factor of critique, of apparent critical 
distance – even of radical opposition - by no means dissipates the ongoing libidinal 
investment in what is being scrutinized.  
Dlamini’s (2009) Native Nostalgia incorporates Boym’s (2001) notions of restorative 
and reflective nostalgia, utilizing them to question current South African longings for its 
apartheid past. The text provides a sense of the type of critique that nostalgia – or in this case, 
personal reminiscence aligned with scholarly reflection – may deliver. The ideal of reflective 
nostalgia here becomes a type of counter-intuition, a means of unsettling commonplaces and 
meta-narratives. Dlamini’s use of nostalgia is neither restorative nor palliative; it does not 
wish for a return, and it inverts rather than affirms political platitudes. One example is the 
idea, which certainly runs against the grain of prevailing struggle histories, that the world of 
apartheid “was not simply black and white, with resisters on one hand and oppressors on the 
other” (p. 56). Apartheid, by contrast, “was a world of moral ambivalence and ambiguity in 
which some people could be both resisters and collaborators at the same time” (p. 156). 
Likewise upended is the master narrative of black dispossession that conceals the multiple 
ethnic, gender and class divisions that run through black communities. Hence Dlamini’s 
critique of racial nativists and political entrepreneurs for whom, respectively, “there are no 
local histories, no differences within black South Africa” (p. 20), no reason not to “take 
advantage of the valorisation of blackness to enrich themselves” (p. 156).  
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Dlamini’s (2009) critical procedure is one that mobilizes a series of reminiscences that 
prove discordant in today’s South Africa, and that cannot easily be accommodated within 
prevailing post-apartheid sensibilities. In this respect his use of memory appear to conform to 
Boym’s category of reflective category, achieving as it does not only defamiliarization and a 
sense of distance, but a “a re-thinking of the relations between past, present and future”, an 
awareness that “the past is not merely that which doesn’t exist anymore, but…[something 
that] might act…by inserting itself into a present sensation”  (p. 50). 
A fascinating deployment of the notion of nostalgia to the topic of post-apartheid 
architecture is to be found in Mbembe (2008) who – especially noteworthy for my concerns 
here – uses the concept in alongside a psychoanalytically-informed notion of repressed 
memories.  Focussing on a trend of commercial architecture that attempts to evoke other times 
and places, Mbembe speaks of “a mode of erasure…accomplished against the duties to 
memory ritualized by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission” (2008, p. 62). The mode of 
effacement instantiated by such architecture relies on an escapist art of verisimilitude, as in 
the case of shopping and entertainment complexes Montecasino, north of Johannesburg, 
which aims to invoke the atmosphere and feel of a rural Tuscan village. What results is a 
paradoxical inscription of time: “the built form has to be constructed as an empty placeholder 
for meanings that have been eroded…rather than remembered” (p. 62). Such buildings 
manifest as signs of forgetting, of the failure of the city to assimilate the passage of time and 
the changes brought by it. Hence Mbembe’s description of an “architecture of hysteria” that 
reiterates the “pathological structure and hysteria inherited from the racial city” (p. 62). 
Switching between an analysis of architectural form and a description of hysteria as 
psychological condition, Mbembe draws attention to the Freudian postulate that hysterics 
suffer from repressed memories and fall prey to regressive forgetting. He is concerned here, in 
short, with the nostalgic attempt to ward off the movement of time: 
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The architecture of hysteria in contemporary South Africa is the result of a 
painful, shocking encounter with a radical alterity set loose by the collapse of the 
[fully segregated] racial city. Faced with the sudden estrangement from the 
familiar resulting from the collapse of the racial city, this architecture aims to 
return to the “archaic” as a way of freezing rapid changes in the temporal and 
political structures of the surrounding world. It is an architecture characterized by 
the attachment to a lost object that used to provide comfort. A magic mirror and a 
specular moment, it allows the white subject to hallucinate the presence of what 
has been irretrievably lost…the hallucination has its origins in a form of white 
nostalgia” (pp. 62-63). 
Several moments within this text are worth emphasizing for the argument I will go on to 
develop. Nostalgia here is the result of something threatening and debilitating; it results in the 
attempt to freeze change; it is a mode of erasure operating against an obligation to remember; 
it entails the role of a type of hallucinatory comfort in the face of something that has been 
lost. 
 
Within the Economy of the Ego 
What is immediately noticeable about the above theorizations is that they bypass the 
psychological. This is not an incidental feature. Viewing nostalgia as a cultural and historical 
formation enables one to avoid claims of psychological reductionism, to (quite rightly) view 
nostalgia as an historical and political phenomenon that is always more than merely personal, 
individual. That being said, despite the critical leverage that the above ideas afford us, we 
need remain aware that what makes good sociological sense does not always prove 
psychologically accurate. That is to say, nostalgia’s proposed efficacy as (sociological) 
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instrument of critique may be undercut by the psychological functions it continues to serve. 
Or, more boldly put: what operates as a progressive trajectory within the field of sociological 
theory might in fact simultaneously function as a bulwark against psychological change.  
This points to a crucial problem with many socio-cultural theorizations: the attempt to 
elide or minimize the psychical dimension of nostalgia. Nostalgia is, after all, despite the 
factors of social and political mediation, a mode of experience, of memory, indeed, of affect. 
To avoid consideration of these necessarily psychological aspects is tantamount to 
sociological reductionism. It seems important then to juxtapose socio-cultural and 
psychological approaches to nostalgia, to view political nostalgia – that of a given community 
or social group in a particular historical political era – as subject to the vicissitudes and 
functions that characterize nostalgia as a psychical phenomenon. It is crucial then to invoke 
that which many contemporary valorisations sideline, namely a sense of how nostalgia might 
function as a psychical operation.  
Laubscher (2011) highlights the fact that nostalgia occurs “within the economy of the 
ego”, suggesting thus that it is a process that falls within the parameters of the dominance of 
the ego. As such a phenomenon of the ego, nostalgia remains a fundamentally imaginary 
activity that idealizes the past and that remains necessarily linked to the operation of fantasy. 
We should stress here that the Lacanian notion of the imaginary points to those psychological 
operations that buttress and substantiate an ego’s sense of itself, either through a succession of 
images with which identification occurs, or via types of (mis)recognition that engender effects 
of understanding, completion and wholeness. In less overtly psychoanalytic terms, one might 
simply say that nostalgia seems typically to support an identity – be it of the single subject or 
a broader community - and those narrative forms that work to sustain it. One should note here 
that there is always a defensive and narcissistic quality to such imaginary, ego-serving 
operations: the priority of securing a likeable self-image invariably trumps the possibility of 
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hearing anything that would prove disruptive. If nostalgia – as individual or group 
phenomenon - is predominantly an imaginary (or ego) function, then it remains a defensive 
formation, underscored by a fundamentally conservative impulse to resist any change to its 
regime of idealising self-understandings. Inasmuch as nostalgia remains a mode of protection, 
an assurance, a comfort to an ego, then it cannot adequately aid us in the ‘unselfing’ – to cite 
Wicomb’s (2011) term – which is such a crucial part of unsettling how one is 
psychologically-located relative to one’s own social and cultural history. 
 A brief tour of the psychological literature provides ample evidence of how nostalgia 
functions to assuage, support and substantiate an ego. For Sedikides, Wildschut and Baden 
(2004), nostalgia is not to be understood via the conceptualizations of 19
th
 Century psychiatry 
as form of melancholia; variant of depression; “immigrant psychosis”; or as intense 
unhappiness or suffering.  Their reference to the New Oxford English Dictionary definition 
(“a sentimental longing… for the past…for a period or place with happy personal 
associations” (1998, p. 1266) enables them to situate nostalgia as a “positive experience…a 
predominantly positive, self-relevant emotion…[with] an affective structure [that] fulfils 
crucial functions” (p. 202). So, while for many authors there is a recognition of sadness and 
psychological pain within nostalgia (Davis, 1979; Hertz, 1990; Holbrook, 1993) - for after all, 
the nostalgic is confronted with the realization that their desired past is forever gone - this 
bitterness is often typified as fleeting (Peters, 1985), as offset by types of pleasure or 
enjoyment of past experiences (Chaplin, 2000; Gabriel, 1993). 
 Davis’s (1979) account acknowledges the bittersweet and ambivalent qualities of 
nostalgia, whilst nonetheless calling attention to the positive tone of the evoked past. 
Sedikides et al. (2004) are thus not without precedent in thinking of nostalgia as a 
disproportionately positive emotion which maintains a therapeutic potential to soothe the self 
from existential pangs. One of nostalgia’s existential functions, they claim, is precisely to 
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substantiate identity, whether through reduction of uncertainty or the facilitation of identity 
attainment (Cavanaugh, 1989). For some, nostalgia protects identity (Kleiner, 1977), and 
should be viewed as an “ego ideal”, or as a mechanism for coping with loss of self-esteem and 
restoring self-worth (Kaplan, 1987). An effective self-affirmation tool (Steele, 1988), 
nostalgia’s recourse to an idealized past enables one to deal with a difficult future to 
strengthen and support identity (Gabriel, 1993). A stronger sense of selfhood is attained, “an 
increasingly unified self, by putting together pieces of past lives through nostalgia” (Sedikides 
et al., 2004).  
Of course one need not agree with the above literature – geared as it is precisely 
towards the goal of ego-affirmation that a Lacanian approach would oppose - to grasp the 
point being made. Despite the ethical, reflective or ‘evolved’ potential of nostalgia asserted by 
the sociological literature, such critical gains are always shadowed by what in psychoanalytic 
terms is the very opposite of a transformative impulse: an ego-substantiating means of 
affirming, supporting and strengthening an identity. While this may seem of less than 
immediate political importance, one should bear in mind that such functions of ‘ego-
conservation’ are not simply psychological. They are emblematic of imaginary operations 
which pertain as much to the maintenance of  a given society’s self-image - its defensive 
narcissism in respect of its repressed histories, its inability to confront or recall difficult or 
self-compromising truths – as that of an individual ego. 
 
Memory in the Mode of the Fetish  
The first psychoanalytic concept that I wish to introduce by way of my reconsideration of 
nostalgia is fetishism. Gevisser (2010) offers a telling remark in this respect. Nelson Mandela, 
he claims, made a political fetish out of his autobiography. This astute comment provides a 
telling example of what I would call fetishistic nostalgia, that is, a loving relation to a version 
NOSTALGIA AS DEFENSIVE FORMATION   16 
of the past which is often recalled and that takes on both a cherished status and a protective 
function. Mandela’s story of his long moral struggle against apartheid took on a hegemonic 
dominance in the era just before and after the demise of apartheid. Subject to the claim that it 
sidelined other struggle histories, the text runs the risk of reducing the complexity of this 
historical period to a triumph of one man’s moral will. Moodley (2008) for example contends 
that “the ANC [African National Congress] has rewritten the whole struggle”, insisting that 
the Black Consciousness Movement “has been written out of the struggle” (p. 274). Gibson 
(2011) makes a related point: “the narrative of a South Africa miracle, personalized by 
Mandela’s story – is almost a marketing gimmick for the benefit of the media” (p. 192). The 
‘feel good’ factor of Mandela’s text, the unity it tacitly imposes on a series of discontinuous – 
indeed fractious and opposed – anti-apartheid struggles, along with the moral resolution of 
reconciliation that made its account of political change palatable to whites in particular, all of 
these qualities speak of its fetishistic appeal. Tirelessly repeated, such a fetishistic history 
makes a type of (‘new South African’) identity possible, it protects one against some or other 
‘castration’ and it generates a degree of pleasure each time it is instantiated.  
 Žižek offers a distillation of the role of a fetish, which he claims, “is the embodiment 
of the lie which enables us to sustain the unbearable truth” (p. 296). Differently put: the fetish 
is that isolated feature or activity that enables the disavowal of a threatening reality. Recourse 
to the traditional anthropological usage of the term proves helpful here: the fetish is that 
magical object revered by a given society because it creates a sense of order and control in a 
frightening world whilst holding a given belief-structure in place. More than just this, the 
fetish permits for an identity to be maintained; it functions to manage anxiety; and, not 
infrequently, to induce a type of love. Long Walk to Freedom and its political role in post-
apartheid South Africa thus proves exemplary: a selective vision of the past is elevated above 
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less comforting rival histories and done in such a way that keeps a series of deep political 
anxieties at bay. 
Crucial also, the fetish allows us to affirm that something is not the case; such is the 
role of fetishistic disavowal in psychoanalytic theory. Take for example the love that white 
South Africa has for Mandela. Not only a focus of libidinal investment and an icon that 
mitigates against anxieties of political transformation, Mandela, as loved-object provides the 
proof of a ‘not’, in this respect proof of the fact that we are not racist. A further aspect of the 
fetish comes into view here: the fetish – particularly the case in fetishised historical 
monuments and forms of remembrance – becomes in effect a license to forget, a type of 
structured forgetting (Hook, 2011b). This chimes with Mbembe’s (2008) earlier account of 
nostalgia as a mode or erasure operating against the obligation to remember. Returning to our 
example:  white investment in Mandela’s ‘walk to freedom’ could be said to be proportionate 
to white amnesia regards complicity in apartheid. Obviously such fetishism would need allow 
for multiple elaborations; different constituencies and generations may fetishize Mandela in 
varying ways (Mandela as grandfatherly and forgiving figure for some; radical protagonist of 
the armed struggle for others; saintly leader and Messiah for yet others). 
1
  Nevertheless, 
bearing in mind the earlier point about how personal forms of nostalgia remain cut from the 
cloth of the social, one can appreciate that such a latitude in particular fetishizations of 
Mandela may nonetheless add up to a type of national, indeed, political, fetishization. We 
might ask then of any instance of nostalgia: what does it enable one to disavow, to forget? 
What identification does such a reminiscence allow one to assert? What ideological world-
view is thus maintained? Similarly: what threat is domesticated, what is effectively disproved 
by virtue of such a remembering?   
                                                 
1 I owe this point to Leswin Laubscher. 
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Clearly, not all instances of nostalgia are fetishistic. I have tried to emphasize above 
that nostalgia need not be seen as constitutively defensive; neither need it be seen as 
inescapably fetishistic. Inasmuch as formations of nostalgia exist within the domain of ego 
however, supporting and extending its idealized self-representations, then these (defensive, 
fetishistic) tendencies remain a possibility even if they are not inherent aspects of nostalgic 
reminiscence. Having made this qualification, it is important nevertheless to stress that the 
notion of fetishistic nostalgia remains an important analytical tool. It enables us to highlight a 
distinctive operation occurring within nostalgia – a type of identity-preservation – and, more 
directly yet, it allows us to pin-point many of the ideological functions of the nostalgia in 
question (disavowal of the present, facilitation of a type of structured forgetting). This 
argument points us to a critical imperative: to focus not merely on the content but on the 
psychical and political functions of nostalgia. It is all too often the case that the captivating 
content and emotional gratifications of nostalgia mitigates against a developed analysis of the 
ideological uses to which it is being put. 
Fetishistic nostalgia, that is to say, runs counter to the effects of ‘evolved’ or reflective 
types. More than just this, the preservative operation of such fetishistic uses of memory is 
enough to topple potentially explorative and ethical uses of nostalgia into less challenging and 
disruptive forms, into affirmations of the ideological status quo. This is not to insists that 
fetishism – and by extrapolation fetishistic nostalgia – is always politically reactionary.  The 
above example would testify to this: not all fetishistic investments in Mandela and the 
struggle narrative of Long Walk to Freedom are politically suspect. Few political movements 
– left or right – could dispense with all fetishistic recollections of the past. Although not 
necessarily reactionary, fetishistic nostalgia is necessarily conservative; it represents a 
reverence towards a protective object, a desperate clinging onto an image or token of a ‘safer 
before’. Such a thorough fantasmatic grounding in the past - which, importantly, protects 
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against difference and reads the present always in terms of an idealized former time - remains 
aversive to change. 
 
In Service of Fantasy 
Reference to nostalgia’s role as fetish against change throws into perspective the fantasmatic 
nature of much nostalgic reminiscence. This quality is openly admitted by Boym in her 
description of nostalgia as “a romance with one’s own fantasy” (2001, p. xiii). Lacan deploys 
an illuminating metaphor in this respect, conceiving the fantasy scene as a frozen frame in a 
film that brings the sequence of images to a halt just prior to the moment of castration.  If 
nostalgia entails such a ‘stop-frame memory’ – an I idea I elaborate further below – then it 
seems necessarily to act against an order of destabilizing recognition. There is a further 
implication to be drawn here. If nostalgia, like fantasy, is conditioned by a certain 
impossibility, should we not then view it as a fantasmatic formation in the technical sense of 
an imaginary figuration that attempts to remedy an impasse, to make good on a lack? This 
would fit with Mbembe’s (2008) account of white fetishism as a mode of hallucinatory 
comfort in the face of threatening change. If this is the case, then from a psychoanalytic 
perspective, we need to take nostalgia seriously. Nostalgia in fact might be said to possess a 
diagnostic function: it contains within it an implicit diagnosis of current social ills, along with 
a potent ‘imaginary of loss’. The latter would serve as an indication both of certain 
prospective melancholic attachments, and – perhaps surprisingly - of a particular set of fears 
that strike to the very heart of a given community’s constitutive identifications. 
 The parallel between fantasy and nostalgia also points to a problem. Clinically 
speaking, fantasy is what must be traversed, worked-through, dissipated. True enough, it 
needs to be present within the analysis, elicited, drawn out, explored; such an objective can be 
viewed as a precondition of a psychoanalytic cure. Then again, it makes no clinical sense to 
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remain enthralled with the fantasy; such a path can only lead to a shoring-up of the imaginary, 
an consolidation of self-comforting images. Although it anchors and frames our perspective 
upon reality, fantasy harbours illusions; it screens out discomforting knowledge; it entails its 
own rewards, its own types of enjoyment, and – at least in this sense – typically feeds 
complacency, resignation, mitigating against any change that would upset a given libidinal 
economy. Fantasy in and of itself – as is I would argue is the case with nostalgia - maintains 
no inherently progressive potential. It is what we do with fantasy or nostalgia that counts, how 
their comforting images, their selective reminiscences of the past may be connected to a 
broader strata of related but less readily accessed memories and associations. Inasmuch 
nostalgia operates to support and extend fantasy – we might offer the notion of fantasmatic 
nostalgia here – then we would do well not to celebrate its transformative potential without 
first investigating the defensive functions to which it may be put.  
 
The Lie of Affect 
The topic of anxiety, introduced above, leads us into a discussion of nostalgic affect. It also 
provides a way of extending the idea of nostalgia as protective device. Given that anxiety is 
so often associated with loss in psychoanalysis theory, and that nostalgic reminiscence is 
premised precisely on an experience of a lost past, then we might claim that anxiety is a 
characteristic affect of nostalgia. This may seem unconvincing, particularly if we take as 
given the oft-cited ‘bittersweet’ quality as the predominant affect of nostalgia. We need look 
beyond the surface here: the fact that not all nostalgia is obviously anxiety-provoking need 
not impede our argument. We might adopt a hypothetical line here: the ‘sweetness’ of 
nostalgia – as in the fetish – perhaps has more to do with what it has enabled one to avoid, 
what is screened, than with the obvious content of what has been recalled. The bitterness – or 
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its associated negativity - of affect may be a more reliable indicator here than the apparent 
sweetness.  
Without dismissing the importance of affect, we should bear in mind the Lacanian 
warning never to trust what would seem most obvious about a given affect. ‘Anxiety is the 
only affect that does not lie’ Lacan (1962-1963) famously insists. Freud, Lacan’s (1962-1963) 
cautioning to analysts is that emotions are continually subject to displacements, to 
substitutions of object, to evasions. As omnipresent as affect is, it is, in and of itself, not a 
form of truth. The affective intensity of nostalgia – its good feeling – may thus be an 
important marker to be aware of, but not necessarily one of its truthfulness.  That is to say, we 
often take the affective ambience of memory, or the clarity, certainty of particular events to be 
indexes of their truth-value. Here, following Freud, we should take such qualities seriously, 
but as indicators that something has fallen out of the picture and needs to be restored. 
What drives restorative nostalgia, says Boym, “is not the sentiment of distance and 
longing”, it is rather “the anxiety about those who draw attention to historical incongruities 
between past and present and…[question] restored tradition” (2001, pp. 44-45). Nostalgia 
here becomes a protection against such anxieties of history. We may add then to the list of 
critical questions apropos the uses and function of nostalgia. How does anxiety factor into the 
particular use of nostalgia we are concerned with? What is the particular anxiety the nostalgia 
seeks to mediate? Kammen asserts that “Nostalgia…is essentially history without the guilt” 
(1991, p.688). Accepting this idea means that we should ask also: how might guilt be 
operating behind the scenes of the particular instantiation of nostalgia we are witnessing? 
A broader critique begins to emerge here. If nostalgia is an outcome, an effect, a 
symptom, then we need look beyond the apparent contents and feelings of nostalgia to its 
causative conditions, to the role of such symptomatic contents. The valorization of nostalgia’s 
imaginary properties limits us to descriptive as opposed to properly analytical readings. 
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Preoccupations with imaginary features blinds us to the underlying psychical or political 
functions of the nostalgia, it prevents us from plotting the dynamic role of nostalgia, its part in 
a broader libidinal economy. 
 
Screen-memory Nostalgia 
Early on in his career, Freud’s attentions were drawn to type of memory that stalled clinical 
work. These were typically childhood memories, often very vivid, that appeared to latch onto 
a trivial facet of experience. While their broader meaning seemed uncertain, such memories 
would repeatedly surface, remaining cut off from a broader associative network. Such 
‘screen-memories were for Freud a compromise between the pressure exerted by troubling 
past experiences that could not easily be retrieved, and the need to keep such memories at 
bay. They were – indeed, are - like static snapshots whose formal exaggerations and triviality 
alert us to the fact that something has been excised. The idea that a dialectical relationship 
exists between memory and forgetting of course bears a distinguished philosophical lineage. 
For Heidegger (1927), memory is possible only on the basis of forgetting; for Ricoeur (2004) 
forgetting is itself a species of memory. Screen-memories are something of a case in point: 
they are the trace – an index - of what has been cut out, forgotten, repressed. 
Part of what is so interesting about screen-memories is the amplification of formal 
features they present. Screen-memories entail a type of stasis: one scene within an associative 
train has been accentuated, made ‘extra-memorable’, a particular feature has been exaggerated 
so as to lock out a less acceptable memory or implication. They are over-compensations by 
means of form for what cannot be retrieved.  A similar logic holds in fetishism, where there is 
likewise a ‘hyper-cathexis’ (of the fetish object/activity) working to the ends of defense. In 
the screen-memory the cathexis is realized in embellishments of form. Hence the idea that in 
clinical psychoanalysis we often need to read form above content. Attention to formal 
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features of the memory – unusual clarity or detail; inability to move forward or backward in 
an associative sequence; repetitions, doublings; saturations of colour, etc. – proves crucial, for 
such features provide clues to what has been ‘extracted’. 
This returns us to Medalie’s (2010) assertion that formal features may indicate the 
failure of memory to transcend unreflecting types of nostalgia. An attention to form likewise 
allows us to approach in a new light Maier’s (1995) comment that nostalgia is to memory as 
kitsch is to art. That is to say – ignoring the potential here for a problematic high art versus 
low popular culture seemingly implied - exaggerations (indeed, over-compensations) of form 
are signs that bolder associative work needs be done. More effort is required, in short, to 
connect past and present, to move from defensive to less readily-yielded forms of memory. 
Different strategies of recollection are required here, from free-associative attempts to 
reconfigure the past, to joint attempts at narrative memory-work, a topic I have addressed 
elsewhere (Hook, 2011a). Indeed, given that a trace of the repressed exists in the form of the 
screen-memory, then nostalgic reminiscences are useful, even though they will need to be 
connected to more expansive types of memory, their more tangential qualities explored. If, as 
Freud insists, a ‘footprint’ of the associated repressed memory remains within a screen-
memory, then this memory needs to be taken apart, approached from multiple different 
deconstructive perspectives such that an exercise of speculative reconstruction might take 
place.  
 
Apartheid Nachträglichkeit 
One of the problems implied by many conceptualizations of nostalgia is that they often rely 
upon a clear-cut differentiation between past and present. Boym (2001) observes that the 
“romantic nostalgic” “insisted on the otherness of his object of nostalgia from…present life 
and kept it at a safe distance” (p. 13). Furthermore: “Nostalgia…is dependent on the modern 
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conception of unrepeatable and irreversible time” (p. 13).  Distinctions between evolved and 
restorative nostalgia often turn on precisely this point: critically-enabling types of nostalgia 
are those which succeed in effective juxtapositions of past and present; restorative forms treat 
past and present as mutually-exclusive. True enough, the nostalgic overlaying of past and 
present can, as in Dlamini’s (2009) analysis, succeed in upsetting a series of hegemonic social 
norms and political commonplaces. However, despite the efficacy of such juxtapositions, one 
cannot but suspect that we are dealing with temporary alignments of past and present that 
quickly revert back into a demarcated sense of ‘then’ as opposed to ‘now’.  
If it is the case that talk of nostalgia often presupposes a linear and clearly 
differentiated conception of time, then a psychoanalytic perspective on non-linear psychical 
time might prove a viable ally in understanding relations of historical causality and agency. 
Psychical time, the temporality of the unconscious, does not, according to Freud, abide by a 
division of historical eras. As he repeatedly insists: the primary process logic of the 
unconscious has no respect for sequential, chronological time; the wishes and fantasies of 
infancy are as fresh in the unconscious as the lingering traces of the previous day. This non-
linear conception of time means not only that we appreciate the simultaneity of past and 
present, but that we understand the role of retroaction.   
The important notion of ‘deferred action’ - Freud’s (1950) idea nachträglichkeit – 
draws attention to the ‘after the fact’ impact of earlier events upon the present and the future. 
As early as 1895 Freud was concerned with the implanting of a pathogenic effect: something 
‘traumatic’ (typically of a sexual nature) occurs, yet it is not realized as such at the time. The 
seed that has been planted will only flower later - its germination reliant upon a subsequent 
event. This theorization is dependent upon an evident discontinuity between two events; for 
Freud this will be the onset of adult sexual life, in the socio-historical realm this may be 
supplied by historical rupture. It pays here to stress the factor of contingency: in both 
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psychical and historical time we live within a condition of suspension, as if a pause-button 
had been pressed at various earlier (pre)‘traumatic’ experiences, with the effect that their full  
impact will only (if at all) be realized once re-activated by later developments.   
The ambiguities of Freud’s (1950) notion are multiple, particularly so in cases of 
concatenated or ‘overrunning’ histories such as that of the post-apartheid era. There is, firstly, 
the idea that the true significance of a past event will only be realized in a subsequent future, 
once retroactively triggered. Neither static nor consolidated then, the fragmentary residues of 
lingering histories themselves constitute latent modes of the present. What this ensures – a 
second important point - is the virtual quality of the present which, underscored by an as of 
yet indefinite past, remains itself precarious, open to further re-articulation. To speak of 
apartheid nachträglichkeit means then that this history has not as yet been fully resolved, that 
it underlies the present, conditioning what it – and its prospective futures – have not as yet 
become. We need add to this, thirdly, the prospect of the movement from the future to the 
past, the retroactive ‘determination’ of what has been by what is to come. This aspect of 
deferred action means that we are caught within the anxious possibility that the re-visioning 
of our past will necessarily change what ‘we will have been’.  
The pertinence of the psychoanalytic notion of retroactive causality to the post-
apartheid context seems immediately evident. One might contend that the simultaneity of two 
eras – as signified by the ambiguous contraction ‘(post)apartheid’ – provides us with a case in 
point of historical nachträglichkeit, the sobering possibility, that is to say, of ‘the post-
apartheid’ being viewed as apartheid’s deferred action. 
It helps here to provide a brief example of retroactive temporality, so as to emphasize 
the different analytical perspective opened up by the notion of deferred action. Barnard’s 
(2004) analysis of the satirical Bittercomix comic strips of South African artist Anton 
Kannemeyer cites the example of a typical work, “Blacks”, a nine-panel page rendered in the 
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clear line style of Hergé’s Tintin images. A self-reflexive statement on the role of comics in 
conducting racist culture, the strip in question follows on from an earlier narrative, in which a 
young boy, Themba, is made by his parents to return a stack of Tintin comics to his white 
friend Daniel, because of their racist content. The sequence of panels in “Blacks” includes 
Kannemeyer himself, who opts, by way of response to this situation to quote a whole series of 
racially derogatory or loaded terms from the Afrikaans dictionary (Handwoordebook van die 
Afrikaanse Taal). An exercise in the type of pastiche that Bitterkomix so excels in, the 
resulting comic strip combines mock dictionary definitions for a whole series of apartheid era 
designations - “hottentot”, “woolly head”, “golliwog”, “Boss”, “Madam”, etc. – with a naïve, 
1940’s style of comic book illustration.  
The resultant effect of disjunction is in part formal: Kannemeyer’s borrowings from 
earlier visual styles and verbal vernaculars turns past historical forms jarringly against their 
former horizons of meaning. Such an exercise in re-contextualization also of course relies on 
a double temporality. By retrieving once accepted apartheid terms – effectively authorized, 
moreover, in the formal register of dictionary definitions – into a public post-apartheid 
context, where such terms must be viewed as objectionable, Kannemeyer is making apparent 
the epistemic violence that had always been a part of apartheid culture. Crucial to the deferred 
action effect of his work – presumably more vividly present for those who knew or 
experienced apartheid – are two key considerations. The realization, firstly, that so much of 
what had been considered unobjectionable and normal within the sensibilities of apartheid 
(the language of ‘Boss’ and ‘Madam’), indeed, even innocent, appropriate for children (as in 
the case of Hergé’s Tintin), was thoroughly laced with racism. This is what makes the 
bluntness of Kannemeyer’s depiction, the undisguised quotation of apartheid terms and 
stereotypes, so forceful. Of course, the racist imaginary rendered in such child-friendly terms 
is far from over. The discomforting charge of the imagery – our second consideration – has 
NOSTALGIA AS DEFENSIVE FORMATION   27 
much to do with the fact that such apartheid thinking still lingers. These images would be far 
less provocative, far less offensive - or so it would seem - if this past were not still with us. 
We have a case then of what is latent, unresolved in the past, indeed, repressed, being 
uncomfortably re-activated in the present.   
This is not, clearly enough, a case of nostalgia (except perhaps of the most perverse 
kind); a different type of historical juxtaposition is at work. One potential difference between 
the two concerns repression: nostalgia, as ego-function, seems typically to flow through the 
censorship of repression so as to deliver a palatable (even if bittersweet) memories. It is worth 
observing, as in this case, that effects of nachträglichkeit - inasmuch as such relations of 
causation are consciously realized - typically entail precisely a coming undone of repression. 
This seems integral to the notion of deferred action: there is a realignment of sorts, an 
epistemic shift, a break in memory – something tantamount to a repression - that separates 
two or more periods. This helps isolate a key difference between the affective experiences of 
nostalgia and deferred action. (We need of course bear in mind that as a theory of paradoxical 
temporal causation, nachträglichkeit may remain unconscious, not experienced as affect at 
all). Whereas nostalgia remains closer to an ego-consolidating spectrum of affects (as noted in 
the psychological literature cited above), deferred action is closer to that of anxiety. Freud’s 
(1950) reference to trauma in respect of nachträglichkeit is here instructive – instances of 
deferred action are typically destabilizing – and hence potentially ‘unselfing’ – inasmuch they 
involve an effective unmaking of one time (be it past/present/future) by another. 
We are now in a better position to draw conclusions regards how the concepts of 
nostalgia and nachträglichkeit compare as modes of historical reflection. Although in a 
nostalgic experience the past may be summoned, brought forcibly into the present, a nostalgic 
sensibility is arguably less than concerned with the relations of causation obtaining between 
these two points. The underlying clinical objective behind the notion of deferred action, on 
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the other hand, concerns precisely the attempt to better understand the complex relations of 
psychical causality that connect past, present and future, each of – to stress the point - remains 
simultaneously active.  Taking such a non-linear approach to history seriously means not only 
that we remain aware of how the apartheid past will continue to be subject to multiple re-
writings. It means that today’s post-apartheid era is still effectively under-defined, subject to 
revision. It likewise means that the post-apartheid future necessarily holds the promise of 
traumatic re-incursions of inadequately processed or ‘ungrieved’ events the significance of 
which have yet to be realized.  
Such an approach seem the very opposite of nostalgic returns to the past which are, as 
we are often told, anchored in the present. The time of nachträglichkeit is, to cite Birksted-
Breen (2003), a ‘reverberation time’, never easily partitioned into historical divisions. Rather 
than affirming the status of the present or indulging in brief comparative reflections, this 
approach to temporality subverts a sense of the ‘here and now’, making apparent that there is 
no ‘pure present’. The notion of nachträglichkeit may hence be read against that of nostalgia. 
Whereas the latter may be accused of presentism, of remaining forever stuck in an idealized 
past, the critical sensibilities of nachträglichkeit undercut and destabilize such divisions, 
emphasising patterns of temporal reverberation and repetition that makes such historical 
localizations untenable.  
Let me conclude this section with three brief assertions. Firstly, the sensibilities of 
nostalgia cannot, in my view, adequately accommodate the paradoxical relations of causality 
existing between past, present and future that can be grasped via an appreciation of 
nachträglichkeit. Secondly, the ego-affirming qualities of nostalgia appear, most typically, to 
leave repression undisturbed. An awareness of retroactive causality is, by contrast, more 
anxiety-provoking and destabilizing, drawing attention as it does to the psychical simultaneity 
of past, present and future, and to various epistemic breaks – repressions – characterizing that 
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history. Thirdly, an awareness of deferred action seems crucial in understanding the 
temporality of transitional societies, such as that of post-apartheid South Africa, where 
adjoining historical eras are often less discrete and more mutually-determining than we like to 
think. 
 
Contrapuntal Resistances 
In what has gone above I have attempted not only to introduce the topic of nostalgia and its 
‘reflective’ and ‘restorative’ uses, but to explore certain of the psychical dimensions of 
nostalgia often neglected in the sociological literature. As a vehicle of critical memory 
practice at the service of historical retrieval, nostalgia no doubt has its uses. I have noted its 
prospective use as diagnostic instrument; its value in de-familiarizations of the present and in 
critical juxtapositions of past and present. I have also questioned whether attempts to utilize 
the ‘reflective’ nostalgia have not under-estimated nostalgia’s role as defensive formation. A 
series of psychoanalytic concepts has proved useful here, enabling us to grasp how nostalgia 
may operate 1) in the economy of the ego, 2) in the mode of the fetish, 3) in the service of 
fantasy, 4) as an affect concealing anxiety, 5) as screen-memory and, 6) as means of reifying 
the present which fails to explore the (often retroactive) causative relations obtaining between 
past, present and future.  
Nostalgia, it then follows, is often, but not solely, a protective device – a way of 
screening history – that preserves select elements of the past while enabling a structured 
forgetting of others. A means of strengthening and comforting an ego (be it of individual or 
group), nostalgia often appears conservative in its ends, aversive to change. If the above 
arguments are to be credited, nostalgia is, furthermore, adept at neutralizing anxiety and in 
obscuring (retroactive) patterns of causation that defy the demarcations of past, present and 
future entailed by linear conceptions of history. What follows is a cautioning: we should 
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investigate each of these possible functions within any given instance of nostalgia before 
proclaiming its transformative potential. I hope by now the pertinence of this critique to the 
field of peace psychology is evident.  If, to follow Freud’s (1914) still pertinent maxim, what 
we cannot recall we are bound to repeat, then, especially in post-conflict societies, we need 
remain vigilant regards the lures of those defensive forms of memory which help us to forget. 
Notwithstanding the above conclusions, we may nevertheless ask, as I intimated from 
the very outset: might some forms of nostalgia not work against such defenses of memory? In 
closing I would like to consider very briefly the beginning of an answer to such a question, 
and do so by looking beyond the realm of psychoanalytic theory to a very different critical 
instrument, Edward Said’s (2003) notion of the contrapuntal. Said borrows this term from 
music composition as a way of making sense of the conflicted experience of life as an exile. 
The moment of the contrapuntal is one of layered experience; of overlapping territories and 
powerful contrasts; of friction and discordance. This experience is often painful and 
destabilizing; previous experiences are juxtaposed against present conditions in such a way 
that neither gains ascendance. The temptation for resolution is kept at bay; there is no 
transcending harmony able to bridge the gap between past and present. Dissonance itself 
becomes here a means of critical realization. Said’s description bears striking parallels with 
our own. The contrapuntal moment, unlike the nostalgic, does not succumb to the defenses, 
the comforts, the neutralizations of an ego-enhancing narrative. It is this factor - that of 
‘unselfing’ - the ability to upset rather than affirm the consolation of  such ego-affirming 
narratives that talk on nostalgia typically lacks. 
Said’s account of exile, at the same time undeniably of nostalgia and yet hopelessly at 
odds with much of the literature on the topic, calls to mind the distinction Tacchi (2003) 
makes in respect of American as opposed to Greek notions of nostalgia. Whereas the former 
takes nostalgia to be a trivializing form of romantic sentimentality, the Greek 
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conceptualization emphasizes ongoing pain, an inability to adapt, the persistence of longing 
and desire for transformation. As Pickering and Keightley (2006) emphasize, the American 
view forecloses the possibility of the past ushering in a transformative role in the present; the 
more visceral Greek conception “evokes a range of bodily experiences to negotiate the past 
and…allows the past a transactional role in the present” (p. 934). It is perhaps through the 
adaptation of the Greek notion into the American, through the anesthetization of nostalgia’s 
qualities of pain and disturbance in favour of ego-enhancing aspects, that much of the critical 
potential of the notion has gone amiss. We might put it this way: it is precisely at the moment 
that the ego-comforts and protections of nostalgia are dissipated, at the point when nostalgia 
becomes less sweet, more troubling, more anxious - exactly when the American notion reverts 
to the Greek - that nostalgia becomes useful to us. 
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